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Over the last 20 years, the role of national parliaments in European Union (EU) affairs has gained considerable 
academic attention. Much of the literature has focused on the parliamentary control function and shown that national 
parliaments are no longer docile lambs willing to be led to the European slaughtering block, but exercise tighter 
scrutiny of their governments in EU affairs. What tends to be overlooked, however, is that the parliamentary 
communication function is at least as important in EU politics. Yet while the literature has discussed reasons why 
members of parliament (MPs) or political parties may prefer to ‘depoliticise’ European issues by conducting their EU 
business away from the prying eye of the public, so far we have little empirical data on how parliaments communicate 
EU politics. This article will therefore provide a comparative analysis of parliamentary debates on EU issues in the 
UK, Finland, Germany and France.  
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Introduction 
Parliaments are multi-taskers. They perform a large number of functions, including the election or selection 
of the government, policy-formulation and legislation, controlling the government and holding it 
accountable, aggregating and representing the interests of their citizens and informing them on important 
policy issues. Among the most important means for parliaments to fulfil a range of these functions, and 
most importantly the information and communication function, are public debates in the plenary or – to a 
lesser extent – in committees. Debates are vital elements of electoral competition as they provide for a 
public articulation of societal interests and the discussion of policies thus informing citizens about complex 
political issues. Without debates allowing the electorate to identify competing leaders and policy agendas it 
is difficult for them to assess the performance of the government and to hold it accountable.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this volume, previous research has suggested that the role of the 
plenary has so far been limited in European issues (Bergman, Müller, Strøm, & Blomgren, 2003, p. 175). 
However, this comparative data is somewhat dated, and it is possible that the debates on transparency in 
EU affairs as well as on the role of national parliaments in EU governance have led to a greater 
involvement of the plenary. Recent research at least suggests that more salient EU topics – such as financial 
 2 
frameworks (De Wilde in this issue), Treaty reforms (Maatsch, 2010), or European Council meetings 
(European Parliament, 2013; van de Steeg, 2010) – do appear to trigger plenary debates. In addition, 
previous research has paid hardly any attention to the variation between legislatures or policy areas, nor to 
the relationship between parliamentary cultures and debates.  
 
Hence this study contributes to the literature through a comparative analysis of EU debatesi in four member 
states:  Finland, France, Germany and the UK. In the next section we discuss both institutional and party-
related factors that may impact the emphasis of parliamentary debates and introduce our hypotheses. In 
section three we outline our case selection and data. Section four presents the longitudinal data on the 
overall level of plenary debates on European matters in the four countries. We show how both institutional 
and party related factors impact the level and nature of debates, with our findings confirming significant 
variation between both the four member states and different types of EU matters.  
 
Institutional Context + Party Interests = Different Outcomes? 
Our basic premise is intuitively very simple: the institutional context, expressed through different 
parliamentary rules and cultures, should produce variation in our dependent variable – parliamentary 
debates on EU issues. While European parliaments perform largely the same set of functions in their 
respective national systems, previous literature has shown there to be significant variation between the 
legislatures in terms of which function is emphasised most (Arter, 2006; Döring, 1995; Norton, 1998; 
Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2003). In addition, national parliaments are party-political institutions, bringing 
together legislators representing different political parties. Government formation is based on bargaining 
between political parties, with the opposition parties trying to unseat the cabinet or increase their support in 
the run-up to the next elections. Parties are also responsible for setting the parliamentary rules of 
procedure: the agenda and powers of committees and the plenary as well as the rights of individual 
members and party groups are all decided by political parties. Hence any realistic explanation of 
parliamentary activities must also include the incentives of parties (Strøm, et al., 2003).  
 
Institutional Factors 
Turning to institutional factors first, a much-used distinction is that between ‘working’ and ‘debating’ 
parliaments (Arter, 1999, pp. 211-217), or between ‘legislating’ and ‘deliberating’ parliaments 
(Loewenberg & Patterson, 1979). Working parliaments are characterised by standing orders that emphasise 
committee work over plenary debates, with a parliamentary culture where MPs focus on scrutiny of 
documents in committees instead of grand speeches on the floor. As the name implies, in debating 
parliaments, on the other hand, the focus is more on plenary debates. In addition, debating legislatures are, 
on average, less consensual, with the opposition using the plenary to criticise the government. The ‘ideal’ 
example of a debating parliament is arguably the British House of Commons, with the Nordic parliaments 
constituting typical cases of working parliaments (Arter, 1999, pp. 211-217; Bergman & Strøm, 2011).  
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H1: Debating vs. working parliaments: the more the parliament resembles a debating legislature, the more 
we expect parliament to fulfil its communication function through plenary debates. 
 
It is plausible, however, to argue that participation in EU governance has contributed to all national 
parliaments becoming more committee-based. After all, all national parliaments have established one or 
more European Affairs Committees (EAC) for coordinating parliamentary work in EU affairs, and the 
specialised standing committees are becoming more regularly involved in EU matters in many parliaments. 
But parliaments differ with regard to the degree to which they have delegated EU affairs to committees. 
While in some parliaments the EAC (or the standing committees) regularly act on behalf of the whole 
parliament, for example when issuing resolutions on EU documents or mandating the government, others 
require or at least permit a vote on the floor of the house and thus the involvement of the plenary – even if 
this does not always include a debate.  
 
H2: Delegation to committees: the more EU affairs have been delegated to committees, the less we expect 
parliaments to fulfil their communication function through plenary debates.  
 
This leads us to a third institutional factor. Even if the bulk of parliamentary work in EU affairs takes place 
in committees, plenary debates may still take place, for example based on motions on EU documents, 
interpellations, topical hours and so on. Thus, another factor is the ability of backbenchers to influence the 
parliamentary agenda, that is, to initiate debates on EU issues. The easier it is for single MPs or groups of 
MPs to put EU issues on the plenary agenda, the more plenary debates we can expect. This is especially the 
case regarding opposition rights. In parliamentary systems of government, public assessment and criticism 
of the government’s actions is mainly the responsibility of the opposition, while we can hardly expect the 
majority party or parties to have a great incentive to engage in publicly scrutinising and much less 
criticising the government (Auel, 2007).  
 
H3: Backbench agenda control: the greater the ability of backbenchers (and the opposition in particular) 
to influence the parliamentary agenda in EU affairs, the more we expect parliaments to fulfil their 
communication function through plenary debates. 
 
Party Strategic Factors 
Institutional factors, however, only provide or constrain opportunities for parliamentary activities. Whether 
these opportunities are actually used also depends on party political incentives. As mentioned above, we 
therefore expect party-related factors to play a decisive role regarding whether parliaments (or MPs) will 
emphasise the communication function and thus have an impact on the importance of parliamentary 
debates in EU affairs.  
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In general, one can assume that where EU issues are electorally salient, parties have to compete publicly 
over these issues to address the interests of their voters. This is even more the case where public opinion is 
unsupportive or sceptical of EU integration. In this case, parties have to assure their voters that they will 
defend their national interests at the European level. However, these general assumptions have to be 
qualified as it may not always be in the interest of parties to politicise EU issues. Where parties are 
internally divided over EU issues, and/or considerably more supportive of EU integration than their voters, 
this may in fact impact negatively on their electoral success (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). For them, EU issues 
are thus more of a liability than an asset, and we can assume they will focus on traditional socio-economic 
issues in public debate. Eurosceptical parties, in contrast, and especially those on the ideological fringes, 
have an interest in politicising EU issues to broaden their voter base, because their position on the left/right 
dimension is likely to limit their potential voter pool (De Vries & Edwards, 2009). This leads us to the 
formulation of the following hypotheses: 
 
H4: EU-scepticism in public opinion: the greater the electoral salience and the stronger the EU-scepticism 
in public opinion, the more we can expect parliaments to fulfil their communication function through 
plenary debates. 
 
H5: Distance: the greater the distance between parties and their voters regarding their support for EU 
integration, the less we can expect parliaments to fulfil their communication function through plenary 
debates.  
 
H6: Internal cohesion: the less parties are internally cohesive regarding EU, the less we can expect 
parliaments to fulfil their communication function through plenary debates.  
 
H7: Presence of anti-EU parties: the greater the share of Eurosceptical parties, the more we can expect 
parliaments to fulfil their communication function through plenary debates. 
 
Case Selection and Data 
The hypotheses developed above should be seen as neither complementary nor as necessarily competing. 
Rather, we investigate what factors, and in which combination, have explanatory value with regard to the 
degree to which parliaments fulfil their communication function through public debates. We have therefore 
chosen the parliaments of four member states: Finland (Eduskunta), France (Assemblée Nationale), 
Germany (Bundestag), and the United Kingdom (House of Commons). The case selection is primarily 
explained by institutional and partisan variation, with the parliaments differing from one another in terms 
of parliamentary rules, EU scrutiny models, and party politics. Given the low number of cases, and the fact 
that some of the variables, especially the institutional factors, are difficult to quantify in a consistent and 
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comparable manner, we do not attempt a quantitative analysis, but rather follow a qualitative-interpretative 
approach.  
 
TABLE 1  
 
Due to space limitations, we present the main institutional and party related variables for the four 
parliaments in Table 1.ii With regard to the dependent variable, we draw on two data sources: our first 
source consists of a longitudinal comparison of the share or amount of EU debates in the four parliaments 
between 2002 and 2010 as well as the issues debated in the plenary to gain insight into the general 
importance of parliamentary debates in EU affairs. In this context, we also examine whether the 
parliaments hold debates about European Council meetings (either ex ante or ex post). This choice is 
explained by the role of the European Council, which ‘functions as the principal agenda-setter, the ultimate 
arbiter in decision-making, and the motor behind European integration’ (van de Steeg, 2010, p. 118).  
 
Problematic for the comparative analysis is that identifying EU debates is rather difficult in some 
parliaments. The Bundestag and the Assemblée Nationale provide a list of what they regard as their ‘EU 
debates’ on their websites for the current and previous legislative periods. And while these may not include 
all debates that have an EU focus, one can argue that these are the debates both parliaments advertise as 
their debates on European issues. In the case of Germany and France, we therefore first calculated the share 
of plenary days with a major EU debate out of all plenary days. Yet given the differences in terms of 
overall parliamentary time spent in the plenary as well as the length of the debates for each topic, the sheer 
number of debates may be somewhat misleading. In a second step, we therefore drew on the Observatory 
of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL) data (see below) to calculate the average share of plenary 
time spent on EU issues. Both the Eduskunta and the House of Commons, in contrast, do not provide such 
information on their websites. Both have a search engine, but without going through the debates manually 
it is impossible to distinguish between debates on genuine EU issues and those where a key word (such as 
‘EU’) was simply mentioned in a different context. Hence the analysis of Finland and the UK is based on 
other parliamentary documents and interviews.iii 
 
In addition, we were able to expand our analysis to include the years 2010 to 2012 by drawing on a dataset 
established in the context of the OPAL projectiv (Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2014, forthcoming). It 
provides data on parliamentary activities in EU affairs between 2010 and 2012 including, inter alia, data on 
the number of EU debates, the topics as well as the share of plenary time devoted to debating EU issues. 
Given that we had to resort to simpler means of identifying EU debates for the period of 2002 to 2010, our 
data is not directly comparable with the OPAL data. As a consequence, we are only able to draw tentative 
conclusions about changes over time in the level of debating activity.  
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For information regarding the institutional factors, we relied on parliamentary standing orders and the 
secondary literature (for details, see Auel & Raunio, 2012). For the party-related factors, we base our 
assessment on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006/2010 and on the European Election Studies (EES) 
2004/2009 as well as the comparative project of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) who distinguish between 
three broad types of contestation: limited, open and constrained. The Chapel Hill data measures party 
positions and internal party dissent on EU as well as the salience of Europe for national parties, whereas the 
EES data is used to examine opinion congruence on the EU dimension between parties and their voters. 
 
Europe in the Plenaries – A Comparison 
 
Finland 
Between 2002 and 2010, plenary involvement in the Eduskunta was very limited. While data problems do 
not allow us to calculate the percentage of EU debates out of all debates, an analysis of plenary records 
between 1995 and 2010 shows that the share of European debates was very low and most likely below that 
found in the Assemblée and House of Commons (see below). Debates focused almost exclusively on ‘high 
politics’ matters such as treaty amendments, Finland’s EU presidencies, single currency, and security and 
defence policy, while standard EU legislation was practically absent from the plenary agenda. The 
Eduskunta also did not debate annual EU budgets, and meetings of the European Council were on the 
agenda only when it convened to amend the treaties.  
 
However, since 2010, we can observe a clear increase in the debating activity of the Eduskunta. Between 
2010 and 2012, 18 debates took place on average per year, which amounts to roughly 14 per cent of the 
overall plenary time. A closer look reveals that around two thirds (63 per cent) of these EU debates were 
crisis-related. Yet despite the importance of European Council meetings and euro summits for the decisions 
on the crisis management and European economic governance reform, ex ante or ex post debates on these 
meetings are still extremely rare.   
 
France 
In the Assemblée topics are usually debated only once, but in rather long sessions. Between 2002 and 2010, 
the share of plenary days with a ‘European’ debate varied between 5-7 per cent. Overall, this amounts to an 
average share of plenary time of a little less than 3 per cent. EU debates largely focused on ‘high politics’ 
matters, but select European laws (including annual debates on the EU budget) were also debated on the 
floor. In particular, plenary debates on parliamentary resolutions were rare: only six were debated in the 
plenary in 2002-2007 and two (both by individual MPs) in 2007-2010.v In contrast, European Council 
meetings were regularly debated ex ante in the plenary. 
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Since 2010, the OPAL data suggest only a slight increase in plenary debates. Between 2010 and 2012, 
between nine and 10 debates took place on average per year, which amounts to around 4 per cent of the 
overall plenary time. And again, a large share of these debates, 62 per cent, was spent on euro crisis-related 
issues. The Assemblée continued to debate European Council meetings ex ante, but did not debate informal 
European Council meetings or euro summits. 
 
Germany 
In the Bundestag, issues are often debated several times, for example in a short debate before and a longer 
debate after the committee stage. Approximately 20 per cent of the plenary days in the 2002-2005 and 
2005-2009 legislative periods featured ‘EU debates’, with the share reaching over 30 per cent in 2009-
2010. This high number is partly due to debates following the decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty and the Bundestag’s participation rights in EU affairs as well as 
debates on the euro crisis in 2010. Given that Bundestag debates are usually fairly short in comparison, this 
amounted to an average of roughly 3.8 per cent of the overall plenary time. Still, as indicated by the higher 
share of European debates, the Bundestag plenary has debated EU laws and other ‘normal’ European 
matters more often than the other three parliaments. European Council meetings were debated ex post until 
the 15th legislative period, but since then the debates have been held before the meetings.  
 
According to the OPAL data, the Bundestag held on average around 42 EU debates per year in 2010 to 
2012, amounting to about 12 per cent of the overall plenary time, which suggests a steep increase. 
However, it may also indicate that the lists of EU debates for 2002-2010 on the website were not 
exhaustive. Overall, the euro crisis played a less important role in plenary debates in the Bundestag 
compared to the French and the Finnish parliaments, with roughly 30 per cent of the EU debates dealing 
with crisis-related issues.  
 
United Kingdom 
The European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons has the right to recommend EU documents 
for plenary debate, but the government decides which topics are debated on the floor – and indeed 
sometimes the cabinet does not follow ESC’s recommendations. Between 2002 and 2009, only between 
one and four documents proposed for debate by the ESC were actually debated (House of Commons, 
2009), which amounts to an average of 0.4 per cent of the annual plenary time. These EU affairs ranged 
from individual directives and policy questions to the EU budget and broader questions such as economic 
governance in the Union. This share does not include the 20 so-called ‘opposition days’ per year, during 
which the opposition can introduce debates on topics of its own choice. However, between 1997 and 2010, 
the opposition under the Labour government used its days to discuss EU issues on only 10 occasions.vi 
‘High politics’ European issues are normally debated on the floor, with treaty amendments particularly 
inspiring long debates in the chamber. Finally, the prime minister also gives an oral statement in plenary on 
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European Council meetings (often both ex ante and ex post), but debates on the meetings were very rare. 
When all these various forms of European debates are combined, it seems that the share of floor time spent 
on EU matters was roughly similar to that in the French Assemblée.   
 
Since 2010, however, EU debates seem to have become somewhat more frequent. The OPAL data give an 
average of 22 to 23 debates per year, which amounts to 3.8 per cent of the overall plenary time. The share 
of debates on the financial crisis is lower than in the other chambers (26.7 per cent) but still rather high 
considering that the UK is not a member of the eurozone. In addition, a quarter of the debates were spent 
on the EU Bill of the Conservative government, the impact of the EU on the sovereignty of parliament and 
the possibility of a referendum over EU membership. The higher number of debates may also explain why 
the Labour party, in opposition since May 2010, made no use of their opposition days to discuss EU issues. 
Only the Democratic Unionist Party used the opportunity once to discuss ‘the European Union’. 
 
Table 2 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article has compared parliamentary EU debates in four member states. The analysis has been guided 
by a number of hypotheses explaining variation between the legislatures with both domestic institutional 
and party-related factors. Our results provide support for our hypotheses, but we can also observe 
interesting deviations that deserve further research.  
 
Overall, the Bundestag had by far the highest share of European debates, at least in terms of absolute 
numbers. It is also the only legislature where standard EU legislation and policy are often debated on the 
floor. European matters features far more rarely on the agendas of the Assemblée, the House of Commons 
and especially the Eduskunta. In the Assemblée and the House of Commons, select ‘normal’ EU issues are 
debated in the plenary, though very infrequently. In the Eduskunta, finally, essentially only ‘high politics’ 
EU matters are debated in the chamber, while normal EU policies are dealt with exclusively in committees.  
 
We believe that our results are primarily explained by party politics. Institutional factors do play a role, but 
only insofar as they serve either the interests of the government (especially in the UK) or the main party 
groups. In particular, our findings suggest that the general distinction between working and debating 
parliaments seems to have little explanatory value in EU affairs. This is especially true for the Bundestag, 
which is the most active when it comes to plenary debates on EU affairs, and the debating chamber House 
of Commons, which clearly emphasises committee work in EU affairs (see also Neuhold & de Ruiter, 
2010). 
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In Germany, parties used to be clearly more cohesive in their pro EU stance than parties in the three other 
countries, and given the rather broad support for European integration in the public, parties did not have to 
fear a serious electoral backlash due to anti-EU sentiments. In addition – and in contrast to the other 
parliaments – the government has more limited control of the parliamentary agenda as all party groups, 
including the opposition, have the opportunity to put their issues on the agenda. Hence in the Bundestag 
both the government and the main parties had less reason not to debate EU policies in the plenary, and both 
government and opposition groups use the opportunities to put EU issues on the agenda. More recently, 
cracks have appeared in the party consensus over the EU with the less pro-European stance of the Christian 
Social Union (CSU) and the Eurosceptic Left List. Whether the increase in debates is a result of these 
developments is difficult to tell, especially given that internal party divisions over the EU have also 
increased. 
 
In the other three parliaments, party politics clearly work against a politicisation of EU issues through 
plenary debates. This was especially the case in the House of Commons until 2010, where the Labour 
government had few incentives to politicise EU affairs. This was not only due to their internal division over 
Europe potentially triggering criticism from their own backbenchers, but also because public debates would 
have given the Eurosceptic Conservatives the opportunity to accuse the government publicly of ‘selling out 
to Europe’ and to score points with the Eurosceptic public and media. It is therefore hardly astonishing that 
British governments prefer to ‘park’ EU issues in the European Committees whose recommendations and 
opinions the governments can also safely ignore. Thus, in the UK, the Labour government used its firm 
control over the agenda to keep EU issues out of the plenary. And considering the internal splits of the 
Conservatives, even the main opposition party had fewer incentives to engage in public debates about 
Europe. As the data since 2010 show, debates have clearly increased under the Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat coalition government, but with over 50 per cent of the debates on the euro crisis, the EU Bill, 
parliament’s role in EU affairs and the EU Referendum, the debate activity regarding other, ‘regular’, EU 
issues does not seem to have increased that much since 2010.  
 
In the Assemblée, debate activity was fairly low between 2002 and 2010, and the slight increase since then 
seems mainly due to the euro crisis. Proposals for resolutions can be put on the agenda by party groups, and 
government control of the plenary agenda is therefore somewhat less tight in EU than in domestic affairs. 
Reasons for the small share of EU debates thus lie not only with the governing parties but also with the 
opposition. Here, the internal divisions of the main parties over Europe also provide a strong disincentive to 
politicise EU issues. This is especially the case for the largest opposition party, the Socialist Party, which is 
characterised by severe internal dissent over the EU. In addition, the gap in support for European 
integration between the parties and the public has widened over recent years. Thus, even though in 
opposition until mid-2012, the Socialist Party had little to gain from initiating public debates. The two anti-
EU right wing parties, the Front National and the Movement for France, finally, have little direct influence 
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on the plenary agenda, although they do, of course, influence the French debate on the EU. While the Front 
National was not represented in the Assemblée until the latest elections in 2012 (now two MPs), the 
Movement for France had only three, currently two, MPs. 
 
The absolute number of EU debates was clearly lowest in Finland, although we detect a steep increase 
since 2010, mainly due to the euro crisis and the politicisation of EU in the run-up to the 2011 Eduskunta 
elections. Here, institutional factors play a greater role since according to the constitution the plenary can 
debate EU matters but is not entitled to take decisions on such issues (with the exception of those questions 
that specifically require parliamentary ratification). This contributes to the Eduskunta essentially only 
debating ‘high politics’ EU matters in the chamber. The Eduskunta is also exceptional as it is the only 
parliament where European Council meetings are hardly ever debated on the floor. However, the decision 
to delegate EU affairs almost completely to the EAC and other committees is, of course, an intentional 
decision of political parties who have designed a scrutiny system for EU affairs which is geared towards 
achieving a broad domestic consensus behind closed doors rather than making EU affairs a matter of public 
party competition. In addition, parties are not only internally divided over Europe, the gap in opinion 
between the parties and their voters also presents a problem, especially for the main pro-EU parties.  
 
Although limited to four parliaments, our findings also shed a rather different light on the involvement of 
domestic legislatures in EU affairs. The powerful Finnish EU scrutiny model, based on the famous 
mandating model of the Danish Folketing and the blueprint for many of the newer member states, clearly 
performed worst in our comparison for the period 2002 to 2010. The Eduskunta is actively involved in EU 
affairs, and was, according to Auel et al. (2014), by far the most active parliament from 2010 to 2012, but 
apart from debates related to the euro crisis more recently, most of this involvement takes place behind 
closed doors. Considering the limited role of plenary debates in European matters, citizens and the media 
have – beyond access to documents – hardly any possibilities to follow parliamentary activities in EU 
affairs. This finding is also supported by Auel et al. (2014): with the exception of the Swedish Riksdag, 
most of the powerful mandating parliaments perform rather poorly when it comes to parliamentary debates. 
This does suggest that strong parliamentary influence and a system geared towards mandating the 
government’s negotiations position may come at a cost regarding transparency. 
 
The picture painted by our limited investigation so far is rather bleak. Over the last two decades, 
parliamentary attention for EU issues has clearly increased, and national parliaments now also provide 
more information on EU politics and their own activities to their electorates, for example through the 
access to documents or minutes of committee meetings. While this may have increased the transparency of 
EU politics at the domestic level, it has not, however, led to a greater politicisation of EU politics or 
increased party competition over EU issues. Rather, the comparison suggests that plenary debates are more 
frequent in the absence of strong party political conflict and Eurosceptic public opinion. While specific and 
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very controversial EU topics and decisions are being debated, so far most parliaments do not live up to 
their task of bringing ‘Europe’ closer to the citizens or enabling them to make informed political (electoral) 
choices and to exercise democratic control on EU affairs. One exception is the euro crisis, which seems to 
have increased the share of debates in all four parliaments, but especially in Finland. In addition, there are 
indications in the literature that the debates over the crisis are also highly polarised, mainly along pro and 
anti integration cleavages in the UK, and along party cleavages in Germany (Wendler, 2012). Whether this 
development will last, however, and spill over into other aspects of European politics, is so far an open 
question. 
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Table 1: Comparison of the Lower Houses of the Finnish, French, German, and UK Parliaments 
Parliament Institutional Factors EU Scrutiny System Party-Related Factors  
Eduskunta Working parliament: emphasis 
on legislative scrutiny in 
committees, firm control of 
government over plenary 
agenda but strong opposition 
rights 
Very strong scrutiny 
system, regular 
involvement of standing 
committees, extensive 
delegation: EAC acts on 
behalf of parliament 
(plenary cannot make 
decisions on mandate)  
Limited contestation (partly due 
to the consensual EU scrutiny 
model), small anti-EU party, 
parties are internally divided over 
EU, larger opinion gap 
Assemblée 
Nationale 
(until 
2008/09) 
Until 2008/09: more debating 
than working parliament, more 
limited role for committees, 
almost complete government 
control over plenary agenda, 
weak opposition rights (until 
2008/09) 
Weaker, regular 
involvement of standing 
committees, broad 
delegation: standing 
committees (but not EAC) 
can act on behalf of 
parliament, but any party 
group can request EU 
resolution be put on agenda 
Limited contestation, but main 
parties internally divided over 
EU, small anti-EU party, 
occasionally strong conflicts over 
EU issues, smaller opinion gap, 
but growing  
Bundestag Working parliament: emphasis 
on legislative scrutiny in 
committees, but parliament 
controls plenary agenda, strong 
opposition rights  
Moderately strong: standing 
committees have formal 
responsibility for EU 
policies, limited delegation: 
EAC can act on behalf of 
parliament under specific 
circumstances, but rarely 
does so  
Limited contestation: fairly solid 
pro-European consensus among 
the main parties, share of anti-EU 
parties relatively small, main 
parties were cohesive over EU, 
but dissent has grown much 
stronger in 2010, small opinion 
gap, but growing 
House of 
Commons 
Debating parliament: central 
role for plenary, almost 
complete government control 
over the plenary agenda, weak 
opposition rights, main 
instrument: opposition days 
Emphasis on careful 
committee scrutiny of 
documents, but weak 
influence, limited 
delegation: resolutions have 
to be voted on in the 
plenary, but usually without 
debate, process dominated 
by government 
Open contestation: strong 
Eurosceptic party, Europe 
features regularly in party 
competition and parties are 
internally divided over EU, large 
opinion gap 
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Table 2: Parliamentary EU debates in the Four Parliaments 2002–2010 and 2010-2012 
 
 
 
Eduskunta Assemblée Nationale German Bundestag House of Commons 
Overall 
share of 
EU 
debates 
2002 - 
2010 
 
 
Focus on high 
politics issues, EU 
laws have been 
debated only twice 
during EU 
membership, no 
debates on 
European Council 
Share of plenary days 
with EU debate:  
2002-07: 30/577 
(5.2%) 
2007-10:  32/467 
(6.8%) 
 
2002–2010: av. of 7.3 
debates per year, 
2.91% of overall 
plenary time 
 
Focus on high politics 
issues, but also debates 
on EU laws, ex ante 
debates on European 
Council 
Share of plenary days 
with EU debate:  
2002-05: 39/187 21% 
2005-09: 44/233 19% 
2009-10: 27/82 33% 
 
2002–2010: av. of 
13.41 debates per year, 
3.8% of overall plenary 
time 
 
Both high politics and 
normal EU matters are 
debated, ex ante debates 
on European Council 
0.4% of floor time 
(1997-2010) spent on 
EU documents, i.e. 
between one and four 
debates per year 
 
Focus on high politics 
issues, but also debates 
on EU laws, rarely 
debates on European 
Council, short oral 
statement by PM   
EU 
debates 
2010–
2012 
OPAL 
Av. of 18 debates 
per year, 14.10% 
of overall plenary 
time 
Share of debates 
on crisis: 63% 
only one debate on 
European Council 
Av. of 9.67 debates per 
year, 3.86% of overall 
plenary time 
Share of debates on 
crisis: 62% 
Ex ante debates on 
ordinary European 
Council meetings, but 
not on informal 
meetings or Euro 
Summits  
Av. of 41.33 debates 
per year, 11.85% of 
overall plenary 
Share of debates on 
crisis: 29.84% 
Ex ante or ex post 
debates on about 2/3 of 
European Council 
Meetings and Euro 
Summits 
Av. of 23.67 debates 
per year, 3.82% of 
overall plenary time 
Share of debates on 
crisis: 26.67 % 
Regular, but very short 
debates on European 
Council meetings 
following a statement 
by the PM  
 
 
Notes 
                                                
i In an earlier, and much longer, version of this article, we also examined debates on three specific major EU issues – 
the European Arrest Warrant, the Services Directive, and the decisions to provide financial aid to Greece through the 
establishment of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism in May-June 2010 – in detail (Auel & Raunio, 
2012). Due to space limitations, we had to cut this analysis from the final version. 
ii See Auel and Raunio (2012) for a detailed discussion of the institutional and party-related variables. 
iii We carried out interviews with selected MPs and parliamentary civil servants in the four countries. We are 
particularly grateful to Graham Ziegner and Peter Saramo for their generous help regarding the House of Commons 
and the Eduskunta data. 
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iv Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL, opal-europe.org). 
v An overview over the plenary debates of the Assemblée Nationale on EU affairs can be found at 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/europe/seances.asp. 
vi The lists of Opposition Day debates for 1997–2010 and since 2010 can be found at http://www.parliament.uk/site-
information/glossary/opposition-days/, last accessed 19.05.2013. 
